Abstract-In this paper, we investigate the roles of cooperative jamming (CJ) and noise forwarding (NF) in improving the achievable secrecy rates of a Gaussian wiretap channel (GWT) when the helper node is equipped with multiple antennas. We decompose the channel from the helper to the eavesdropper into two orthogonal components: one is aligned in the direction of the channel between the helper and the legitimate receiver (direct component) and the other is in the orthogonal direction to the channel between the helper and the legitimate receiver (orthogonal component). We then propose a strategy in which the helper uses the orthogonal component to transmit pure Gaussian noise as in the CJ strategy while he uses the direct component for either CJ or NF depending on the given channel conditions. We explicitly derive the optimal power control policy for this strategy and give the achievable secrecy rates when the direct component is used to perform CJ or NF. We hence derive the channel conditions where CJ is better than NF over the direct component and vice-versa.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of introducing artificial noise in a GWT channel by a helpful interferer to confuse the eavesdropper and im prove over the secrecy capacity of the original wiretap channel was introduced in [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . In [2] , [3] , [4] , this notion was called cooperative jamming (CJ). The term refers to the cooperation strategy in which a helping interferer transmits white Gaussian noise when it can hurt the eavesdropper more than it can hurt the legitimate receiver and hence improve the achievable secrecy rate. In [5] , the idea of helping interferer was applied to the GWT channel in a scheme tantamount to the CJ scheme for the two-user multiple access wiretap channel where one of the users performs cooperative jamming. In [6] , the destination carried out jamming over the feedback channel to confuse the eavesdropper.
In the context of relay networks with secrecy constraints, the role of cooperative jamming when the relay node has a single antenna was further investigated in several works, e.g., [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , and [11] . Cooperative jamming strategies in multiple antenna relay networks were investigated in [12] , [13] , and [14] . In [12] , a cooperative jamming strategy is proposed when the relay is equipped with multiple antennas. Under the constraint that the jamming signals must lie in the subspace orthogonal to the channel vector between the relay and the destination, the antenna weights and transmit power of the source and the relay that maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to a total transmit power constraint were derived in a closed form. In [13] , cooperative jamming strategies were proposed for a half-duplex two-hop multiple antenna relay system where the eavesdropper's channel state information was unknown. In [14] , a cooperative jamming strategy is proposed for two-hop relay networks where the eavesdropper can wiretap the transmission in both hops. In the model in [14] , the source, the destination, and the eavesdropper have multiple antennas, whereas the relay has a single antenna. Under a similar constraint to the one in [12] , closed-form solutions were derived for jamming bearnformers that maximize the achievable secrecy rate, and the optimal power allocation was obtained using numerical methods.
In all the references above, the role of a helping node was restricted to cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. However, a helping node can also play other roles to improve secrecy. In general, in the relay eavesdropper channel, the relay, which is assumed to be a trusted entity, can help improve secrecy either by listening to the source or by acting as a deaf helper. The role of a relay node to provide and improve secrecy in a wiretap channel was first studied in [15] . In particular, reference [15] introduced another passive (deaf) mode of cooperation, called noise forwarding (NF), in which the relay node sends a dummy (context-free) codeword drawn at random from a codebook that is known to both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper to introduce helpful interference that would hurt the eavesdropper more than the legitimate receiver. This deaf cooperation strategy was applied without power control to the Gaussian single-relay single-eavesdropper channel in [16] . The idea of such strategy is to create a virtual multiple access wiretap channel where only one user (the source) is active, i.e., sending relevant information, while the other user (the relay) is acting as an interferer that sends a signal drawn from a given codebook. In this way, the destination can perform successive decoding and cancel out the relay signal and achieve higher secrecy rate for the intended message.
In [17] , the roles of both CJ and NF strategies in single an tenna relay networks was investigated. Reference [17] derives the conditions under which a deaf helper performing either CJ or NF strategy would give rise to a larger achievable secrecy rate than the secrecy capacity of the original GWT channel. In addition, the same reference gives the optimal power allocation policy for each of the two strategies under the assumption that the source, the deaf helper, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper have perfect knowledge of all the relevant channel gains.
In this paper, we extend the model in [17] and consider the case where the deaf helper is equipped with multiple antennas. Interestingly, this extension leads to a new set of results that were not available in the single antenna case. In particular, we show that having multiple antennas allows us to decompose the relay-eavesdropper channel into two orthogonal components, one in the direction of the relay-destination channel (direct component) and the other in the orthogonal direction to the relay-destination channel (orthogonal component). Accord ingly, we obtain the optimal deaf cooperation strategy (CJ or NF) along each channel component. It is intuitive that the orthogonal component should be used for cooperative jamming. However, it is not clear what strategy should be used along the direct component. It is not also clear how the relay should distribute its power on these two components.
In this paper, we fully answer these two questions. We give, in terms of the model fixed parameters, the necessary condi tions for each of the CJ and the NF strategy to be useful when employed along the direct component, i.e., to improve over the optimal secrecy rate achievable when the transmission from the relay is constrained only to the orthogonal component. In particular, our results show that along the direct component of the channel either CJ is useful or NF is useful but not both. Moreover, there are some cases (which are described in this paper) in which neither CJ nor NF is useful along the direct component. We fully characterize in the closed-form the optimal power allocation policy at the source and the relay for each of the two strategies and hence show how the relay should optimally distribute its power on the two channel components.
Finally, we present numerical examples to illustrate the gains in the achievable secrecy rates by our CJ and NF strategies when the relay is equipped with multiple antennas. Our simulation results clearly show that the rate achievable by our strategies are, in general, significantly larger than those achieved when no splitting of power between CJ and NF is allowed.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the following communication scenario. A single-antenna source, s, sends a confidential message to a single-antenna destination, d, over an AWGN channel in the presence of an informed eavesdropper, e, that also has a single antenna. The communication also occurs in the presence of a helper node, r, that is equipped with K antennas, K � 1.
The helper node r is assumed to be a deaf relay, i.e., it can only help improve the secrecy capacity of the GWT by transmitting interfering signals that are independent of the source message. In literature, there are two proposed strategies for useful interference introduced by a helper node [2] , [3] , and [15] . In the first strategy, known as cooperative jamming, one allows r to help by transmitting pure Gaussian noise whereas in the second strategy, known as noise forwarding, r sends a dummy codeword from a code book known to both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. By proper scaling of the channel inputs and accordingly modifying the power constraints at the source and the helper nodes, without loss of generality, one can express the outputs of the GWT channel, with a multiple-antenna deaf helper, at the destination and the eavesdropper as
where h r E JR K is the vector of the channel coefficients between the helper r and the destination d, g 8 E JR, g r E JR K are the channel coefficient scalar and the channel coefficient vector from the source s and the helper r to the eavesdrop per, respectively, Nand N ' are standard Gaussian random variables that denote the noise at the destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, X 8 E JR, X r E JR K are the channel input scalar and the channel input vector at the source s and the helper r, respectively. The channel inputs are subjected to the following average power constraints:
By possibly writing g r as the direct sum g r = foh r + U r where h� U r = 0, one can write X r in (1)- (2) as the sum of two orthogonal components. That is, X r = X r O + X r l where
where "f r O = 11 h r 112 and "f r l = 11 U r 112. Thus, we can write
Z = Vfj;X s + foh� X r O + U� X r l + N ' (7) Note that X r O and X r l in (4) and (5), respectively, can be arbitrarily correlated. However, in order to obtain closed form expressions for the power control policy of the strate gies proposed below, we will take both X r O and X r l to be independent. We call X r O the direct component of the helper's signal since it is in the same direction as the channel component h r from the helper to the destination while we call X r l the orthogonal component of the helper's signal since it is orthogonal to the channel component h r . We consider the following optimization problem:
where RCJ (P s , Q r O, Q r d is given by (9) . Note that 8R CJ (P " QrO,Qrl) > O. Thus, from the second constraint in 8Qrl 12) . Hence, the optimization problem given by (12)- (13) reduces to 
We note that ii could be positive or negative depending on the relative values of I r O and I r l. In particular, ii ?: 0 if and only if I r O ?: I r l, i.e., the magnitude of the direct component is greater than that of the orthogonal component.
Let (P;:J, Q ? o J) be the maximizer of (14) subject to (15).
In the next theorem, we fully derive the optimal power control policy (PPJ,Q ? o J) for maximizing RCJ.
The optimal policy (PPJ,Q ? l ) is given as follows: Let (P s NF ,Q;! /) be the maximizer of (24) subject to (25). Before we give the optimal power control policy (PI' F , Q;! /), we first give the following useful lemmas.
Lemma 1: A necessary condition for the NF strategy to be useful along the direct component of the channel is to have a � 0 and a + (3 < 1.
Proof First, to show that a � 0 is necessary, suppose that a < 0 one can easily verify that 8R;,F( P s, Qr O ) < 0 for all 
However, it is not hard to see that ql(P s ) < 0 for any P s > O. Thus, for any P s ,Q r o � 0,
8RNF(p Q )
we have 2 8Qr S ; r O � 0 if and only if Q r O E [ 0, q2(P s )] where Q2(P s ) = Q ; o (P s ) where Q ; o is given in (31). Thus, it remains to show that Q ; o (P s ) � 0 (and hence [ 0, Q ; o (P s )] is not empty) whenever 0 � P s � P; where P; is given in (30). We note that Q ; o (P s ) � 0 if and only if ¢ � O. Since ¢ is quadratic in P s , it is not hard to see that ¢ � 0 whenever P s lies between the two roots of ¢. However, one of the roots is negative and the other is positive due to the fact that a + (3 < 1. Indeed, the positive root is P s * ' Hence, ¢ < 0 and consequently Q ; o (P s ) > 0 whenever 0 � P s � P s * ' •
In the next theorem, we fully derive the optimal power policy (PI' F ,Q;! /) for maximizing R NF .
L � t Q ; p be as defined in (31). The optimal policy (PI' F , Q;! /) is given as follows:
We have the following four possibilities depending on the values of a, 9 s , and (3: 
" NF -" NFthen P s = Ps and Q r O = "( r OP r .
C. C] versus NF
In the next corollary, we use the results of the above two theorems to compare the two strategies. In particular, we show in terms of the parameters of the deaf cooperation model when it is better to use CJ than NF for transmission along the direct component X r O and vice versa. We also give the conditions for which both CJ and NF along the direct component are useless. .
then P s = P s = Ps and Q r I = "( r lP r , I.e., the optimal power strategy at the relay in this case is to jam with full power along the orthogonal component and transmit nothing along the dire � t comp � nent. W�ereas, if, in addition to (38), 9s 2: 1, then P,fJ = p ;, F = Q r I = 0, i.e., no transmission occurs at all and hence the achievable secrecy rate is zero in this case.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
First, consider the system described in Section II. We compare the optimal secrecy rates RC J and R N F achievable by our CJ and NF strategies proposed in Section III with the optimal secrecy rate Ro achievable by the strategy that uses only the orthogonal component of the channel for CJ.
We also compare these rates to the secrecy capacity C GWT of the original Gaussian wiretap channel with no relay. In Figure 1 , we set Ps = 5, P r = 2, gs = 0.85, "( r O = 2, and "( r 1 = 1. We plot RC J, R N F , Ro, and C GWT versus yo, ° :::; fo :::; 4, where, as in Section II, fo is defined as g� r � r .
It is clear from Figure 1 that the necessary conditions given in Next, we consider the case where the relay is constrained to using only one of the two modes (CJ or NF) over all the channel components, i.e., the relay cannot split its power between CJ and NF. We denote the optimal secrecy rate (with power control) achievable in this case by either RSM -c J or RS M -N F depending on the single mode of deaf cooperation that the relay is using. It is clear that RS M -C J = RC J where RCJ is the optimal secrecy rate achieved by our CJ strategy since in this strategy the relay jams over the two orthogonal components of the channel and hence it is indeed a single-mode strategy. However, in our NF strategy the relay o. 9 ,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,-------- 
;e. x: 0.5
The optimal achievable secrecy rates by the our CJ and NF strategies, R J and R N F , the optimal achievable secrecy rate with no transmission along the direct channel component, Ro, and the secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel, CGWT , as functions of va where, as in T Section II, va is defined as g r h r . "rO uses the orthogonal component for CJ whereas it uses the direct component for NF. Therefore, intuitively, we must have R N F > R SM -N F in general. To illustrate this, in Figure 2, we plot R NF R SM -CJ R NF -SM and C GWT versus fa 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we extended the idea of deaf cooperation to the multi-antenna deaf helper model. We showed that the multiple spatial dimensions available in this model can be exploited in the deaf cooperation paradigm by possibly decom posing the relay-eavesdropper channel into two components, a direct component in the direction of the relay-destination channel and an orthogonal component that is orthogonal to the relay-destination channel. We proposed two strategies for deaf cooperation in this model. In one strategy, the direct component is used by the relay to perform NF whereas in the other strategy, it is used for CJ. In both strategies, the orthogonal component is used for CJ. Under the assumption of independent signaling along each component, we derived the optimal power allocation for each strategy. We also found the necessary conditions for each strategy to be useful, i.e., to achieve secrecy rate higher than the secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel and showed that both strategies cannot be useful at the same time. The optimal achievable secrecy rate by our NF strategy, R N F , the op timal achievable secrecy rate by the single-mode CJ strategy, R SM -CJ , the optimal achievable secrecy rate by the single-mode NF strategy, R SM -NF , and the secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel, CGWT , as functions of va.
